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the state of discernment in readers hastening down the road of 
the "obvious " . 
The historical and conceptual intersection of Goethe and 
Mathematics is one of the pivots of the History of Science and 
of the Humanities: historically at that moment when the physical 
sciences in certain ways reach and surpass the influence previously 
exerted by theology, literature, and philosophy; conceptually the 
pivot has commanded the attention of dozens of Greats in diverse 
fields: from Schopenhauer and Helmholtz to Valery and Heisenberg. 
Mr. Kanaev's succinct section on the subject serves as an invita- 
tion to further inquiry. 
All in all, Mr. Kanaev's book is the best on the subject in 
one volume I have seen, even in the tongue of Goethe. The 
reviewer wishes to close the review with the motto with which 
Mr. Kanaev opens his book, a maxim of Goethe that is as appropriate 
to a viewing of Goethe and Science as to Goethe's viewing of 
science: Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft ist die Wissenschaft 
selbs t . 
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A theory and a pudding are certainly very different things 
but in a certain sense they can be compared: the proof (or the 
refutation) of both being the eating. Moreover, subjective taste 
has something to do with theories as well. Thus Mr. Aiton has 
rendered a truly good servicein presenting a complete assortment 
of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century vortex theories 
versus attraction theories. By reviewing -- and reviving -- a 
wide variety of now largely forgotten theories he not only recon- 
structs an absolutely necessary though somewhat aberrant round- 
about in the evolution of ideas, but also discloses a lot about 
the subtle and elusive role of scientific taste (or "theory- 
ladenness") in the choice between theories and ideas in complex 
problem situations. 
After a brief survey of the main features of the pre-Cartesian 
(Copernican) celestial dynamics and the theory of falling bodies, 
the author gives a fully documented description of Descartes' 
vortex theory, emphasizing that it was a theory of universal 
gravitation as against "the Keplerian idea of gravity as a mutual 
attraction between heavy bodies and the earth." This early 
rivalry is then inherited by the successors of the two theories, 
but the roles with respect to universality are exchanged: in 
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the second half of the seventeenth century attraction theories 
gain more and more in universality and vortex theories are 
constrained to employ more or less ingenious ad hoc devices. 
Even so, after the late and rather slow diffusion of the Newtonian 
system in France, vortex theories can only survive by trying to 
find a reconciliation between the two competing systems. The 
last days of the vortex theory are thus marked not only by a 
large-scale desertion in favour of the Newtonian system, but also 
by the submerging of some vortex-ideas into the collective 
unconscious of science, only to emerge a hundred years later in 
the nineteenth-century aether theories. 
The bulk of Aiton's narrative deals of course with the 
different kinds of vortex models, from the theories of Huygens 
and Leibniz through those of Villemot and Saurin to the late 
versions of Mairan, Moligres, Duclos, and Fontenelle. Most of 
these theories lying between the "Scientific Revolution of the 
seventeenth century and the "Encyclopedean" lumisres of the 
eighteenth (both somewhat overinvestigated by historians of 
science) are little known -- or disregarded -- even by historians 
well versed in the sources of early modern and modern science. 
Thus Aiton's book casts much new light on an age which is still, 
despite the much cited and now classic Crise of Paul Hazard and 
the recent pre-Kantian investigations of Gerd Buchdahl, quite 
neglected and unrevealed. 
However, this is not the only, and perhaps even not the main, 
merit of the book. Indeed, because of its relevant interpreta- 
tions and paraphrases it can be read as a complete case study in 
"theory-competition" versus "normal science," though Aiton does 
not mention either Kuhn or Lakatos or in fact anybody from the 
ranks of the large post-Popperian "History and Philosophy of 
Science" movement. The different hypotheses are dealt with in 
the classical context of the problem of conceptual change; thus 
e.g. we are often reminded of the want of a concept or of a 
mathematical method in the development of an idea. Similarly, 
the central role attributed to Kepler's laws as an unavoidable 
touchstone in the evaluation of the competing hypotheses and 
theories is repeatedly emphasized by Aiton, and its character as 
an obligatory "minimal condition" is underlined by showing the 
intrinsic epistemic value of a theory giving Kepler's laws with 
the greatest possible "Denk6konomie." However, Aiton makes 
explicit that historically Newton's theory was not the only 
hopeful candidate, since Leibniz's ingenious harmonic vortex 
model, though it "could not do what could not be done," was a 
bold and mathematically unexceptionable attempt to reconcile 
Kepler's laws with the circulation of a vortex, and the objections 
of Newton and the Newtonians missed the point since they did not 
understand the outstanding mathematical framework (in a sense 
preparing the modernization of the Newtonian synthetic notation) 
of Leibniz's argument. 
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From a mathematical point of view one of the chief interests 
of Aiton's book is perhaps his frequent and pertinent comments 
on the role and the form of mathematical reasoning both as 
hypothesis-testing and theory-building in those early days of 
the evolution of dynamics. The delicate interplay of dynamical 
arguments and mathematical methods is demonstrated not only by 
emphasizing the inadequacy of the mathematical foundation of 
the majority of vortex theories, but also by analyzing the 
concept-generating properties of the rare exceptions: the 
theories of Huygens, Leibniz, Saurin, and the Bernoullis. Even 
the great (but by no means firm and in its original form never 
complete) success of Newton's system is shown to be chiefly the 
result of a dynamically (at least at an abstract level) simply 
interpretable mathematical model, making possible easy and 
surprisingly exact calculations. This interpretational unity 
and numerical superiority of Newton's system largely compensated 
for the then far from negligible metaphysical drawback of the 
introduction of "an attraction, whose nature even its supporters 
did not attempt to explain." However, there was nothing like a 
revolutionary switchover from one theory to the other, nor was 
"puzzle-solving" at a certain time replaced by a scientific 
revolution. Even as late as the age of Daniel Bernoulli *'the 
choice between the Cartesian and Newtonian systems was not 
simply a question of deciding between logical alternatives, but 
involved a subjective judgment after weighing the various argu- 
ments for and against the two systems." "Maupertuis' Newtonianism" 
for instance "sprang from the failure of the Cartesian theory to 
explain phenomena, especially Kepler's laws." Is it necessary 
to call attention to how "Popperian" the thinking of Aiton's 
Maupertuis is? One of the charms of this useful and learned 
book is that it displays how an "old-style" Koyr6an analysis, if 
ably done, may lead to a quite fashionable "rational reconstruc- 
tion," which may hold (or may be falsified) even in our 
Feyerabend-paradox-haunted days of history and philosophy of 
science. 
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The concept of cause has played a central role throughout the 
long history of man's attempts to understand the natural world, 
